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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court rendered two decisions addressing issues
of federal employment discrimination law on June 24, 2013: University

of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar1 and Vance v. Ball
State University.2 The opinions have many similarities: Both deal with
analytical frameworks developed to prove and evaluate intentional
discrimination claims; both were decided in a way that favors
defendant employers over plaintiff employees; both were decided 5-4
with the same majorities and dissenters; both majority opinions stated
that the decision was likely to result in fewer trials of discrimination
claims; both majority opinions rejected the position of the Equal
*
2013 William R. Corbett, Frank L. Maraist Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center of Louisiana State University. I thank Gretchen Fritchie, LSU Law Center Class of 2014,
for her assistance in the preparation of this Essay.
1.
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).
2.
Id. at 2454.

135

136

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC

[Vol. 66:135

Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"); and both dissents
were authored by Justice Ginsburg and read from the bench. 3
Furthermore, the two cases prompted Justice Ginsburg to conclude
the dissenting opinions with a call to Congress to overturn the
decisions, as she had done in 2007 in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.4 Apparently this strategy worked in Ledbetter, as
President Obama signed the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
overturning the legal principle articulated in that case. According to
commentator Jeffrey Toobin, in Vance and Nassar Justice Ginsburg
ran her Ledbetter play again," but he predicted it is less likely to
succeed this time.5
I, too, urge Congress to amend the employment discrimination
laws, but not by running "the Ledbetter play" again. Congress should
stop patching the employment discrimination laws by enacting
statutes to change the law announced in specific cases. Such a nickeland-dime approach to reform of the law is precisely what led to the
sharply divided decision in Nassar. Instead, Congress should take a
page from the playbook of the United Kingdom's Parliament and
undertake a comprehensive reform of employment discrimination
laws, as Parliament did in the Equality Act of 2010.
Part I of this Essay discusses the Vance and Nassar decisions,
highlighting Justice Ginsburg's dissents calling on Congress to
overturn the Court's holdings. As Part I discusses, commentators, too,
for more than a decade have been calling on Congress to "fix" the
employment discrimination law that the Court has developed.

3.
Rob Silverblatt, Justice Ginsburg'sRecord-Breaking Day: Ginsburg Dissents From the
Bench in Hotly Contested Cases, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 25, 2013),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/06/25/justice-ginsburgs-record-breaking-day.
4.
550 U.S. 618 (2007), abrogatedby statute, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. In Ledbetter,
the Court gave a grudging and strict interpretation of when a timely charge of discrimination
alleging discriminatory pay practices must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. The Court held that the discrete act of a discriminatory pay practice triggers the
running of the 180 (or 300) day charge-filing period; a charge must be filed within 180 days of
each discrete discriminatory act. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act overturned the decision by
establishing three different events that constitute an unlawful employment practice and
commence the running of the charge-filing period, thus more carefully tailoring the limitations
period to the various acts of discrimination in compensation. The three events are as follows: 1)
when a discriminatory compensation decision or practice is adopted; 2) when an individual
becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or practice; or 3) when an individual
is affected by such a decision or practice, including each time the individual is paid resulting
from the decision or practice. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2013); 29 U.S.C.§ 626(d)(3)
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act) (2013); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), incorporating 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5; (Americans With Disabilities Act); 29 U.S.C. §791 & 794 (Rehabilitation Act of 1973)
(2013).
5.
Jeffrey Toobin, Will Ginsburg's Ledbetter Play Work Twice?, THE NEW YORKER (June
25,
2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/06/ruth-bader-ginsburgledbetter-play.html.
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Congress has responded to several Supreme Court decisions,
overturning or adjusting the law announced in them, most notably in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. However, as Part II discusses, the
incremental approach of Congress's responding to one or more
Supreme Court decisions every few years is not adequate to repair and
modernize the employment discrimination laws of this Nation. Part II
briefly describes the comprehensive approach of Parliament and
recommends that Congress legislate accordingly.
II. VANCE AND NASSAR
A. Vance
The issue in Vance was, "Who is a supervisor?" Is it anyone
who has authority to direct other employees' daily work activities, or
is it only those who have ultimate authority, such as hiring, firing,
demoting, promoting, and so on? This question matters because
employers can be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19646 for sexual harassment perpetrated by their employees. When
the harasser is a non-supervisor, the employer is liable if negligent-if
it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
prompt and effective remedial action.7 However, it was generally
believed that employers should be held liable more readily for
harassment perpetrated by supervisors, and in 1998 the Supreme
Court effectuated that result by announcing a standard for imposing
liability for supervisor harassment that was more plaintiff friendly
than the foregoing negligence standard in Burlington Industries, Inc.

v. Ellerth8 and Faragher v. Boca Raton.9 Under the supervisor
standard, an employer is strictly liable if the harassment results in a
"tangible employment action," such as firing or demoting, but if no
tangible employment action results, the employer may try to prove a
two-part affirmative defense to avoid liability. 10 In the aftermath of
Faragher and Ellerth, plaintiffs argued that their harassers were
supervisors in order to benefit from the more favorable analysis. The
circuits split on what authority a supervisor must have.
The Vance Court held that a supervisor must have authority to
take tangible employment actions against the victim." Although the
6.
(2006)).
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
See, e.g., Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2441.
524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761; Farragher,524 U.S. at 807.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443.

§§

2000e to 2000e-17
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Court did not think that Faragher and Ellerth resolved the issue
before it, it did decide that the answer was implicit in the framework
created in those cases. Because the pivotal question in the framework
is whether a tangible employment action was taken, the Court held
that "the strong implication" is that supervisors have the authority to
take tangible employment actions. 12 In so holding, the Court rejected
as ambiguous and unhelpful the EEOC's interpretation of "supervisor"
in its Guidance. 13
Justice Ginsburg's dissent advocated adopting the definition in
the EEOC Guidance. She argued that the majority's definition was
inconsistent with the assumptions about "supervisor" in prior
decisions,1 4 and that it ignored "workplace realities." 15 The dissent
contended that the majority's decision to define "supervisor" narrowly
would "diminish[ the force of Faragher and Ellerth, ignoreH the
conditions under which members of the work force labor, and
disserveH the objectives of Title VII to prevent discrimination from
infecting the Nation's workplaces." 16
The majority and dissent disagreed about the ramifications of
the Vance decision. The majority argued that the decision would not
diminish protection against sexual harassment because the negligence
standard
for non-supervisor harassment
provides sufficient
protection.1 7 In contrast, the dissent predicted that plaintiffs who
cannot avail themselves of the supervisor analysis will face "a
hazardous endeavor."18
B. Nassar
The issue in Nassar was whether the "motivating factor"
causation standard and the associated mixed-motives analytical
framework apply to retaliation claims under Title VII, as they do to
discrimination claims under the Statute. Some background is helpful
in understanding how this issue arose. For many years, two proof
frameworks have been used to prove and evaluate individual
disparate-treatment claims. The first is the pretext framework
developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

12.

Id. at 2448.

13.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (1999).

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2462 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2455.
Id. at 2451-52.
Id. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Green.19 The second is the mixed-motives framework developed by the

Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.20 However,

the Price

Waterhouse framework was modified when, in the Civil Rights Act of
1991,21 Congress incorporated the two parts of the mixed-motives
analysis, "motivating factor" and the same-decision defense, into two
new sections in Title VII. 2 2 Congress not only codified the mixedmotives analysis, but it also selected the causation standard from
Price Waterhouse-motivating factor rather than substantial factorand changed the effect of the same-decision defense, rendering it a
limitation on monetary remedies rather than a defense to liability.
"Motivating factor" is the threshold for the "mixed-motives" analysis,
which generally is considered more favorable for plaintiffs than the
pretext analysis. For two decades, the courts applied both the pretext
and mixed-motives frameworks to disparate treatment cases under
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). In 2009, the Court

surprisingly held in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 2 3 that,
because Congress did not amend the ADEA to include "motivating
factor"-and "because of' means but-for causation-the mixed-motives
framework does not apply to the ADEA. Left unanswered was the
breadth of the holding: Did it imply that but-for causation is required
for, and the mixed-motives analysis is inapplicable to, all employment
discrimination provisions that have only the "because" statutory
language? Enter Nassar.
The plaintiff in Nassar asserted a claim for retaliation under
Title VII after he had asserted a discrimination claim. The Fifth
19. 411 U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is a three-step
analysis with a shifting burden of production. First, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
which basically requires the plaintiff to prove that he or she is in a protected class, there is a job
available, and the plaintiff is basically qualified to perform the job, although the elements vary
somewhat depending on what type of adverse employment action the employer took. If the
plaintiff satisfies the burden at the first stage, at stage two the employer bears the burden of
production to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. If
the defendant satisfies the burden of production at the second stage, the burden of production
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for
discrimination.
20. 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989). In the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis there were
two stages with a shifting burden of persuasion. First, the plaintiff must prove that the protected
characteristic was a motivating or substantial factor (the case produced no majority opinion on
the standard of causation) in the adverse employment action. Then the burden of persuasion
shifts to the defendant, who could still win the case and avoid liability by proving the samedecision defense-that it would have taken the same adverse action for nondiscriminatory
reasons.
21. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of

42 U.S.C.).

§§

22.

42 U.S.C.

23.

557 U.S. 167 (2009).

2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
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Circuit had applied the mixed-motives analysis to his retaliation
claim, rejecting the argument that Gross controlled. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Congress did not amend the Title VII
retaliation provision to include "motivating factor." Therefore, as the
Court held regarding the ADEA in Gross, a plaintiff asserting a
retaliation claim must prove that a retaliatory motive is the but-for
cause of the adverse employment action.
The Nassar majority examined the history of Title VII law from
its 1964 passage, to Price Waterhouse, to the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
to Gross. Turning to the structure of Title VII, the Court concluded
that because there is no meaningful textual difference between the
Title VII retaliation provision and the antidiscrimination provision in
the ADEA, the conclusion, as in Gross, is that Title VII retaliation
claims require proof of but-for causation. 24 The Court stated that the
higher standard of causation is important to "the fair and responsible
allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation systems." 2 5
Explaining further, the Court cited the dramatic increase in
retaliation claims filed from 1997 to 2012-more than double. The
Court explained how an employee, fearing termination for a jobrelated reason, could set up a retaliation claim by making a meritless
claim of discrimination before the adverse action, only to claim
retaliation for making the claim when the adverse action is taken. In
the face of such frivolous claims, employers would have difficulty
obtaining summary judgment under the motivating factor standard. 26
The majority opinion also addressed two other points raised by the
dissent. First, the Court rejected the argument that it should defer to
the EEOC's interpretation, expressed in a guidance manual. The
Court found that the EEOC's explanations supporting its position
lacked the persuasive force necessary for Skidmore27 deference.
Second, the Court rejected the argument that even if the "motivating
factor" standard in Title VII did not control the result, the Court's
decision in Price Waterhouse should. The majority did not think that
Price Waterhouse survived the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991. In sum, the Court found its holding to be supported by the "text,
structure, and history of Title VII."2 8
Again, Justice Ginsburg dissented, focusing on the majority's
elimination of the "symbiotic relationship" between discrimination and

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531.
Id. at 2532.
Id.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534.
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retaliation. 29 The dissent argued that the majority, by holding that
retaliation was outside the scope of the motivating factor provision in
Title VII,30 was attributing to Congress an intent at odds with
Congress's clear purpose to strengthen Title VII in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.31 The dissent mocked the fact that the majority
analogized the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII and the
ADEA in Nassar but distinguished them in Gross: "What sense can
one make of this other than 'heads the employer wins, tails the
employee loses'?" 32

C. Nassar and Vance Dissents: Calling on Congress to Fix It
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinions in both Vance and
Nassar call upon Congress to intervene, as it has in the past, to repair
the damage wrought by the Court's decisions. In Nassar, the dissent
proclaimed that Nassar and Vance "should prompt yet another Civil
Rights Restoration Act." 33 The invitation to Congress was reminiscent
of Justice Ginsburg's closing in her Ledbetter dissent: "Once again, the
ball is in Congress' court. As in 1991, the Legislature may act to
correct this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII." 34
There also has been a growing crescendo among scholars in the
past decade or so that federal employment discrimination law is
broken and Congress needs to fix it. And Congress has responded to
Supreme Court opinions several times. The most far-reaching
response by Congress was the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in which
Congress amended Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
abrogating ten Supreme Court decisions. 35 In fairness, the 1991 Act
did more than simply overturn cases, but it did not do enough. As
mentioned, the Ledbetter dissent's call to Congress was answered with
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.36 The Americans with Disabilities
Act Amendments Act of 200837 abrogated the law announced in two
Supreme Court decisions.

29.

Id. at 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

§ 2000e-2(m).

30.

42 U.S.C.

31.

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2539 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

32.

Id. at 2545.

33.
34.

Id. at 2547.
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 660 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,

dissenting).

35.
36.
U.S.C.).
37.
12101).

H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 1 (1991).
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42
Pub. L. No. 110-325,

§ 2,

122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§
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The most curious failure of Congress to respond is the nonpassage of the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act
("POWADA"), 38 which would have changed the law announced in
Gross.39 Given the considerable negative reaction to the Court's
holding that age-discrimination plaintiffs have to prove but-for
causation, 40 it is surprising that both political parties did not push
passage of POWADA.
Now Justice Ginsburg has twice called on Congress again to
respond to Supreme Court decisions that reduce protections under the
employment discrimination laws. If Congress were very sensitive to
the Court's opinions, it might respond. Nassar seems effectively to
ensconce the but-for causation standard for most discrimination and
all retaliation claims. Beyond Nassar's far-reaching impact on
discrimination law, the Court's discussion of the large volume of
retaliation claims, the ease with which plaintiffs can assert meritless
claims, and the need to dismiss such claims at summary judgment,4 1
is a rather bald assertion that the Court intends to reduce the number
of retaliation claims that are asserted and that go to trial. The Court
articulated a similar intention, though not as bluntly stated, in Vance.
The Court said that the supervisor definition would permit resolution
of many cases as a matter of law, and plaintiffs would know before
filing what they must prove. 42 Nonetheless, as Jeffrey Toobin points
out, the political realities are different in 2013 than they were when
Congress passed the Ledbetter Act. 4 3
III. CALLING ON CONGRESS TO FIx IT: LEGISLATE LIKE PARLIAMENT
Although I am sympathetic to the dissent's calls for Congress
to fix the "wayward" opinions of the Court, particularly Nassar, I do
not think that Congress should continue its approach of simply fixing
what it considers errant decisions. Congress should take a holistic
view of our very complex body of employment discrimination law and
undertake a thorough reform of it. Forget "the Ledbetter play"! Take a
page out of the playbook of the United Kingdom's Parliament: Develop

38. S. 1756, 111th Cong., (1st Sess. 2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong., (1st Sess. 2009).
39. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
40. See William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment DiscriminationLaw: Does the
Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 683, 709 &

n.127 (2010).
41.
42.
43.

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2450.
Toobin, supra note 5.
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and enact an ambitious reform law similar to the Equality Act of
2010.44

A. The Inadequacy of the Ledbetter Play
The problem with Congress's approach to fixing particular
decisions is well illustrated by the opinions in Nassar. The majority
interpreted Congress's amendment of specific sections of Title VII via
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to be a clear indication that those
amendments were not intended to apply to any other sections of Title
V11 45 -precisely as the Court had reasoned in Gross regarding the
ADEA. The dissent, on the other hand, reasoned that the narrow
interpretation by the majority was at odds with the purpose of the
1991 Act-to expand protections against employment discrimination.4 6
Why did Congress amend only Title VII by inserting the mixedmotives analysis? Perhaps, as the dissent suggested, because it was
reacting to Price Waterhouse, a Title VII sex-discrimination case. The
1991 Act was Congress's most ambitious reform of the discrimination
laws to date, yet it demonstrates that the episodic approach to fixing
discrimination law has proven problematic and inadequate.
The incremental approach of patching the laws not only creates
the uncertainty evidenced in Nassar and Gross, it also means that
Congress is not expressing views regarding many emerging theories,
concepts, and principles developed in case law. (For example, what
does Congress think about gender stereotyping as a theory of
discrimination?) Nor has Congress indicated whether concepts
developed in later-enacted laws should apply to earlier laws. Should
the theory of "regarded as" or perceptive discrimination-expressly
provided for in the ADA-apply to Title VII and the ADEA?

B. Take a Page from Parliament'sPlaybook
Our employment discrimination law is asymmetrical, differing
from one statute to another, and confused. If you don't believe me, try
to teach the course! The United Kingdom found itself in a similar
position. With a three-decade-old body of law, featuring nine
antidiscrimination laws described as "outdated, fragmented,
inconsistent,
inadequate,
inaccessible,
and
at
times

44. Equality
Act,
2010,
c.
15,
§
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/149..
45. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532.
46. Id. at 2540 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

149

(Eng.),

available

at

http://
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incomprehensible,"4 7 a research team, supported by an advisory board
and panel of experts, undertook a year-long study that culminated in
2000 with a detailed report recommending a single equality act.4 8 That
report was followed by a Discrimination Law Review reaching the
same recommendation in 2007.49 Those efforts came to fruition in 2010
with one comprehensive law replacing the others. The particulars of
the law are not as important here as is the approach-comprehensive.
IV. CONCLUSION
When it enacted early discrimination laws, the U.K. studied
and followed the model of the U.S. and Canada.5 0 As the oldest of our
discrimination laws reaches its fiftieth anniversary in 2014, it is time
for Congress to look to the U.K.'s example. As much as one may
disagree with any single decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, running
the Ledbetter play is no longer the answer. In the words of Justice
Ginsburg, "The ball is in Congress's court."

47. Bob Hepple, The New Single Equality Act in Britain, 5 THE EQUAL RIGHTS REV. 11, 13
(2010), available at http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/bob%/ 20hepple.pdf.
48.

BOB HEPPLE ET AL., EQUALITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK 1 (2000).

49.
50.

Hepple, supra note 47, at 14.
Id. at 12.

